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NON LIQUET: FROM MODERN LAW 
TO ROMAN LA W* 
ALFREDO MORDECHAI RABELLO" 
To Federico Carpi infriendship 
I. MAY THE JUDGE REFUSE TO PRONOUNCE JUDGMENT? 
In modern legal systems, the judge cannot as a rule evade his basic duty, 
that of adjudicating. He has the option of either allowing or of rejecting 
the plaintiff's claims. Under the criminal procedure rules adopted by 
several countries, a judge may acquit for insufficient evidence. ( But he 
cannot be released from exercising his function as a judge, claiming 
either that the facts of the case are not sufficiently clear to him (factual 
doubt), or that the norm to be applied in the specific case cannot be 
determined Uudicial doubt), or even that there exists no fixed norm for 
* An explanatory note on the structure and limits of the present essay may be useful. In 
studies which also have a historical character. it is customary to present the subject matter in 
chronological order, first outlining the more ancient legal system, following then as far as possible 
its evolutionary steps, finally to end with the analysis of existing legal systems. In this article, 
however, in order to place the reader in medias res he is presented with modern legal systems with 
which he is already familiar: in such systems it is practically inconceivable that the judge should 
refuse to give judgment in case of doubt. After the arguments adduced in justification have been 
discussed, the author turns to the problem in the context of Roman law, reaching some conclusions 
de lege ferenda. Neither the criminal aspect of the problem i.e., that of the penalty incurred by a 
judge for omitting to perform his duty of pronouncing judgment, nor the problem of non-
justiciability which as recently been the subject of intense controversy, is dealt with in this article. 
** Montesquieu Emeritus Professor of Legal History and Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Professor, Faculty of Law, Haifa University. 
\. For the discussion of problems connected with dismissal for insufficient evidence, see A. 
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the determination of the case (lacuna in the law)2. Thus the Code Civil 
des Fran~ais (or Code Napoleon) lays down explicitly: "A judge who 
refuses to decide a case, on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure or 
insufficient, may be prosecuted as being guilty of denial of justice."3 
This article is the outcome of a long evolutionary process. Prior to the 
French Revolution, before the separation of powers, the main question 
was not that of lacunae but rather that of the directions given to the judge 
in order to help him carry out his functions. In the Middle Ages, when 
the judge was confronted with a situation in which to his best knowledge 
no available norm could be applied, he used to turn directly to God 
(God's Judgment).4 This was the custom, especially in France, during the 
10th, 11th and 12th centuries; and in some rare instances God's 
Judgment tended to provide a solution not only to questions of fact, but 
even to questions of law.s 
Later, during the 13th to 16th centuries, seeking a more rational solution 
to disputes and using the written text of the (traditional) oral law, the 
judge was expressly expected to be able, in dubious cases, to pass 
sentence according to his conscience or by the process of analogy. 
"Judges generally are, moreover, also legislators: they fill the lacunae in 
2. It is not our intention to examine here the important and interesting question of lacunae in 
general, but only insofar as they relate to the specific problem of non liquet; for the general question 
see N. Bobbio. Lacune del Diritto. 9 NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 419 (1963) and the anthological 
work LE PROBLEME DES LACUNES EN DROIT (c. Perelman ed .• 1968). 
3. .oLe juge qui refusera de juger sous pretexte du silence, de I'obscurite ou de I'insuffisance 
de la loi. pourra etre poursuivi comme coupable de deni de justice" (art.4). See J. NORMAN. L'OFFICE 
DU JUGE ET LA CONTEST A TION (1965). Boileux, commenting on this article, observes . 
Let us remark here that the judge appointed to solve a litigation must perforce 
pronounce (doit necessairement prononcer); he is even forbidden to suspend 
sentence in order to consult with the legislator on the meaning of the law: such 
a consultation (rejerej would amount to a denial of justice, and denial of jus-
tice is punished by a fine .... " J .M. BOILEUX. 1 COMMENT AlRE SUR LE CODE 
NAPOLEON 28 (6th ed. 1866). 
See also E. BONNIER, TRArrE THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES PREUVES EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT 
CRIMINEL 49 (1873), including a discussion of the principle actore non probante reus absolvitur as 
an obstacle to non liquet. 
4. On God's judgment, see M.A. Benedetto, 7 NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 899 (1961); J. 
Gaudemet, Les Ordalies au Moyen Age: Doctrine, Legislation et Pratique Canoniques, 2 RECUEILS 
DE LA SOCIETE J. BODIN, XVII, LA PREUVE 99 (1965); H. LEVy-BRUHL. LA PREUVE JUDICIAIRE 
559 (1964). 
5. On this point see J. Gilissen. Le Probleme des Lacunes du Droit dans {'Evolution du Droit 
Medieval et Modeme, in LE PROBLEME DES LACUNES EN DROIT 197. 205 (C. Perelman ed .• 1968) 
which provides the main source of the present brief historical excursus. See also A. FERTILE, 6:2 
STORIA DEL DlRITTO ITALIANO DALLA CADUTA DELL1MPERO ROMANO ALLA CODIFICAZIONE 199 
n.8 (1966). 
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the law with their own rulings."6 In dubious cases it was admissible to 
invoke the authority of local experts. 
Later again, as written law came to prevail over oral tradition, a 
hierarchy of sources was established: the magistrate was supposed to 
consult first the written law, then oral traditions and ultimately to refer to 
Roman law, or rather to the ius commune scriptum, which included not 
only the Justinian law, but also canon law and the commentaries of 
jurists, glossatores and post-glossares: Quicquid non agnoscit glossa non 
agnoscitforum.7 This method, however, could not solve all the problems: 
gaps were sometimes discovered even in the written common law. 
Then, on the basis of Romanist texts and under the influence of authors 
(mainly De Ghewiet in Belgium and Domat in France), it was decided to 
follow what appeared to be analogous and equitable; and these principles 
can even be found in modern codes. On the other hand, during the 
ancient regime the principle of monarchy as the sole source of law was 
steadily gaining ground (rex fons est omnismodi iustitiae and qui veut le 
roi, si veut La Loi).8 
In 1766 Louis XV declared that all legislative power belonged to him, 
without restriction and in its entirety. The King considered it to be his 
exclusive prerogative to fill any gaps in the law and in case of legal 
doubts the judge was obliged to turn to him and to his council. 
"Reference to the legislative power (refere au legislatij) derives from the 
recourse to interpret the law. While the courts are empowered to interpret 
the law, they cannot contradict its terms and its clear construction: in 
case of serious doubt, they must ask the legislature, i.e. the King, who 
will then issue a 'declaration of his will' ."9 
This refere au legislatif remained in use even after the French 
Revolution, due to a rigidly dogmatic view of the separation of powers, 
considered as a protection against royal absolutism. Thus, under a law 
dated August 1790, in case of serious doubts as to interpretation the 
judge was required to consult the Law and the legislative power, based in 
the people. This method, however, proved even more dangerous than the 
evil it sought to remedy. Not only did it disturb the balance between the 
6. Gilissen. supra note 5 at 202. 
7. "He who knows not the commentaries knows not the court". On the many problems 
connected with that ius commune see F. Calasso, 1 MEDIO Evo DEL DIRITIO, LE FONTI 345 (1954) 
(for the dogmatic conception see in particular, p. 375); see also G. Ermini, Diritto Comune, 5 
NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 826 (1960). 
8. "The will ofthe King is the will ofthe Law." 
9. Gilissen, supra note 5 at 229. 
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powers in favor of the legislature, it even led in effect to outright 
violation of the principle of non-retroactivity. For this reason the authors 
of the Civil Code of 1804 preferred to compel the magistrate to pass 
judgment even where the text of the law was silent. The outcome was, on 
the one hand a widening of the powers of the judge and on the other 
hand, the abolition of the former option given to the judge to turn for 
help to the legislative power. 
A further stage in this development was reached a century later, in 
Switzerland. There is an evolution of a century between the Napoleonic 
Code and the Swiss Civil Code. Article 4 of the French and Belgian Civil 
Codes expresses a certain lack of confidence in the judge, justified under 
the ancien regime, but clearly not so nowadays; indeed Article 258 of the 
Belgian Penal Code has become anachronistic. 
It may be said that the Swiss Civil Code, elaborated at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, reflects the spirit of the most advanced jurists of 
that time."l0 Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code indeed provides that: "In 
the absence of suitable legal dispositions, the judge pronounces 
according to custom and, in the absence thereof, according to such norms 
as the judge himself would lie down, was he called to act as legislator."11 
The rule prohibiting non liquet therefore finds its implicit or explicit 
expression, in practically all-modern legal systems. 
However, it should be noted that they consider the question mainly from 
the perspective of the judge when confronted with the juristic norm to be 
applied to a specific case. Thus, one of the introductory provisions to the 
Italian Civil Code (art. 12) states that "In applying statutes no other 
meaning can be attributed to them than that made clear by the actual 
significance of the words, according to the connection between them, and 
by the legislative intent." 
If a controversy cannot be decided by a precise provision, consideration 
is given to provisions that regulate similar cases or analogous matters. If 
10. E. Wolf, Les Lacunes du Droit et leur Solution en Droit Suisse, in LE PROBLEME DES 
LACUNES 105 (C. Perelman ed., 1968). 
11. "A defaut d'une disposition legale applicable, Ie juge prononce selon Ie droit coutumier et, 
a defaut d'une coutu me, selon les regles qu'il etablirait s'il avait a faire acte de legislateur." On this 
important issue see A. MEIER HA YOZ, DER RICHTER ALS GESETZEBER: EINE BESINNUNG AUF DIE 
VON DEN GERICHTEN BEFOLGTEN VERFAHRENSGRUNDSATZE 1M BEREICHE DER FREIEN 
RICHTERLICHEN RECHTSFINDUNG GEMASS ART. lABs. 2 DES SCHWEIZERISSCHENN 
ZIVILGESETZBUCHES 221 (1951) with several (not always accurate) quotations from other codes. 
See also G. CHIOVENDA, PRINCIPI DI DIRITIO PROCESSUALE CIVILE NAPOLI 74 (4th ed., 1928) (with 
bibliography); and G. Du PASQUIER, LES LACUNES DE LA LOI ET LA JURISPRUDENCE DU TRmUNAL 
FEDERAL SUISSE SUR L'ART. I CCS (1951). 
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the case still remains in doubt, it is decided according to the general 
principles of the legal order of the State."12 In such a case, rather than 
interpreting a norm, and before interpreting it, the question is to seek it or 
to reframe it. 13 But the specific problem of the judge confronted with a 
case of factual doubt is not even mentioned, and the case must be 
adjudicated according to the general principles of the burden of proof. 
Yet in some legal systems, there is a tendency to deny the effect of res 
iudicata to a decision given only on the ground of a party's failure to 
raise the burden of proof, i.e., when the judge cannot "find" the facts 
positively or with any degree of certainty. 14 
In English law the judge's duty to adjudicate is recognized by the 
Common Law and some of the most prominent judges, like Pollock, 
consider this to be the essential function of the judge, so that refraining 
from giving judgment is tantamount to a denial of justice.15 
This situation is similar to modern Israeli law. The following precedent 
may serve as an illustration: "I am not ashamed to acknowledge", says 
the judge, "that I cannot tell whether the truth is with the plaintiff or with 
the defendant", adding that "both versions were equally plausible." 
Therefore, the judge absolved the defendant, since the plaintiff, upon 
whom the burden of proof rested, had been unable to adduce more 
persuasive evidence. 16 
12. Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.] (It). "Nell'applicare Ie legge non si puo' ad essa 
attribuire altro senso che quello fatto palese dal significato proprio delle parole seconde la 
connessione di esse e della intenzione dellegislatore. Se una controversia non puo essere decisa con 
una precisa disposizione, si ha riguardo aile disposizioni che regolano casi simili 0 materie 
analoghe; se il caso rimane ancora dubbio, si decide secondo i principi generali dell'ordinamento 
giuridico dello Stato": notwithstanding its location, its scope of application is not restricted to the 
Code. 
13. For a wider study of this proposition see F. MESSINEO, MANUALE DI DIRITIO CIVILE E 
COMMERCIALE 65 (1947); C.P.C. art. 55 (Italian Code of Civil Procedure). For some interesting 
critical notes on the practicalities of judges' functions, see G. Lazaro, La Funzione dei Guidici, 26 
RIvISTA DI DIRITIO PROCESSUALE I (1971). A1lgemeines Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] art. 7 
(Austrian Civil Code); C6digo Civil art. 6 (Spanish Civil Code); C6digo Civil arts. 5, 7 (Brazilian 
Civil Code); and the Albanian Civil Code art. 2. See also MEIER HAYOZ, supra note 11. 
14. This tendency is found, for instance, in Austrian law; see H. Lorber, Das Non Liquet, 1970 
OSTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [OJZ] 537; H. HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 28, n.19 (1998). For a general view, including the historical evolution and present norms of 
civil law, see G. Pugliese, Giudicato Civile, Storia Diritto Vigente, 18 ENCICWPEDIA DEL DIRITIO 
727 (1968); A.M. Rabello, Working towards Codification of Israeli Private Law: Between Common 
and Civil Law, in H. HAUSMANINGER ET AL. EDS., DEVEWPMENTS IN AUSTRIAN AND ISRAELI 
PRN ATE LAW (1999). 
15. See G. WHITECROSS PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 88, n.168 (3rd ed. 1964). 
16. Vorbichik v. Schoengarten, 1964, (III) 18 P.O. 95; Attorney General v. A Bach, 
Magistrate, 1954, 9 P.O. \056, \064; this decision, criticized on appeal, was commented on with 
approval by E. Hamon, How should a Judge act when he cannot choose between the credibility of 
either plaintiff or defendant?, 21 HAPRAKLIT415 (1965). The decision was ultimately upheld by the 
5
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Perhaps, from the Israeli experience, new light has been shed in the 
limitation of this theory regarding the event of lacuna since the passing 
of the Foundations of Law Act 1980 which provides that: 
Where the court, faced with a legal question requiring decision 
finds no answer to it in statute law or case law, or by analogy, it 
shall decide it in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, 
equity and peace of Israel's heritage. I? 
This is a norm directed at incorporating traditional Jewish law, at least in 
part, in the Israeli legal system. 
Supreme Court, see E. HARNON, LAW OF EVIDENCE 188 (1970) (in Hebrew). Such a decision has the 
validity of res iudicata. In some recent enactments however, such as the Civil Procedure Rules, 
1963, K.T. 1477, 490, a distinction is made between the rejection of a plaintiffs claims on the 
merits, effective as res iudicata, and the mere striking out of the action which does not preclude the 
filing of a new action on the same cause; see on this subject S. Ginossar, Renewal of Actions, in 5 
STUDIES IN LAW 48 (1958). See also E. Hamon, Res ludicata and Identity of Actions, I ISR. L.R 545 
(1966): 
In considering this problem, some emphasize the idea that a presumption of 
truth is attributed to the decisions of courts. Res iudicata pro veritate accipi-
tur. Relying on this rationale, the Supreme Court in Israel came to the conclu-
sion that a former judgment should not have the effect of res iudicata as col-
lateral estoppel is the court did not make any positive findings on the contro-
versial issue. 
For frequent reliance on this idea by the Supreme Court in Israel see Felman v. Shachav, 1952, 6 
P.O. 313,321,323; Knopfv. Popper, 1956, to P.O. 785, 793; Mugrabi v. Vardimon, 1957, II 
P.O. 1242, 1250. On the problem of lacunae in Israeli law, see G. Tedeschi, Article 46 of the 
Palestine Order-In-Council and the Existence of Lacunae, in LE PROBLEME DES LACUNES STUDIES 
IN ISRAELI LAW 275 (1959); G. Tedeschi, L'lnsufJicienza della Norma e la Fedelta dell'lnterprete, in 
RrvISTA DI DIRrrro CIVILE 7 (1962) containing some interesting considerations on Talmudic law. 
On the questions of non-justiciability see also the dissertation of Y. Zemach, Political Questions in 
Israel and the United States (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia), and 
more generally, A. Witkon, Justiciability, I ISR. L.R. 60 (1966). 
17. Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 Laws of the State of Israel 181 (Ministry of Justice 
trans., 1980); on this law see primarily: A. Barak, Gaps in the Law and the Israeli Experience, 20 
MISHPATIM 281 (1991); A. Barak, The Foundations of Law Act and the Heritage of Israel, 13 
SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-HAIVRI (1987); H. BEN MENACHEM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW ACT 
- How MUCH OF A DUTY? 257; H.H. COHN, RESIDUARY LAW 285; M. ELON, MORE ABOUT THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW ACT 227; E. SHOCHETMAN, ON ANALOGY IN DECISION MAKING IN JEWISH 
LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW ACT 307; S. SHILO, COMMENTS AND SOME NEW LIGHT ON 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW ACT 351; B. SCHERESCHEVSKY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW ACT 379; 
A. Kirschenbaum, The Legal Foundation Law, 1980 - Today and Tomorrow II IYUNEI MISHPAT 
117 (1985); G. Procaccia, The Foundations of Law Act 1980, to IYUNEI MISHPAT, 145 (1984); M. 
Cheshin, Israel's Heritage and the Law of the State, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF HAIM H. COHN 47 (R. Gavison ed., 1982); M. Keshet, Foundations of Law Act 1980, 33 
HAPRAKLIT611 (1980); G. Tedeschi, The Law of Laws, 14 ISRAEL L.R. 145 (1979); S.Z. Feller, The 
Application of the Foundations of Law Act in Criminal Law, in SEPHER SUSSMAN 345 (A. Barak et 
aI., eds., 1984); Y.M. Edrei, The Foundations of Law Act as a Statutory Source for Judicial Activism, 
in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 127 (A. Porat ed., 1993). 
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This law historically underwent decades of debate and controversy18 until 
its final wording19 a debate that has manifested itself in the judicial arena, 
though albeit in only a meager number of decisions.20 With relevance to 
our discussion, the law directed to the judge, constitutes a de jure 
obligation upon the judge to pass jUdgment, even in the event of lacuna. 21 
18. For the historical overview highlighting the fierce discussions in the Knesset acting as a 
constituent assembly over the nature and form of the law, to the 1959 precursor of the eventual bill 
until its ultimate promulgation, see EWN, supra note 17; SHILO, supra note 17,351-353. 
19. For an insight in the legislator'S intent, see Foundations of Law Bill and the appendix in A. 
Barak, Gaps in the Law and the Israeli Experience, 20 MISHPATIM 280-283 (1991). In the 1959 
discussion in Knesset, the term Jewish Law (Mishpat Ivri) was proposed connoting direct application 
of the legal material in this system, only to be ultimately replaced in its final draft by the more 
amorphous term, "Israel's heritage." For the purpose of clarity, jurists have interpreted "Israel's 
heritage" as merely a synonym for Jewish Law, see ELON, supra note 17,253-256; SHOCHETMAN, 
supra note 17, 307-308; SCHERCHEVSKY, supra note 17. Those opinions dissenting include: A. 
Barak, The Foundations of Law Act and the Heritage of Israel, 13 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-
HANRI (1987); MENACHEM, supra note 17; CHESHIN, supra note 17; COHEN, supra note 17; SHILO, 
supra note 17. 
20. In the approximately forty cases which have been decided in the Israeli Supreme Court, 
two major conflicting views have emerged concerning the interpretation of the Foundations of Laws 
Act. Justices A. Barak and M. Elon hold these two approaches. The positions are dealt with at length 
in Handels v. Bank Kupat Am Ltd., 35(2) P.O. 785 (1980); the first case to examine the act in the 
supreme court since its coming into force. Justice Barak interprets the statute as applying only in 
legal areas of lacunae; and if a gap in the system indeed exists, i.e., no answer has been found in 
statute law or case law, the judge must then follow a two-tier examination: the search begins first 
and foremost with the process of analogy and only in the rare instances that a suitable analogy is not 
found, is the judge obligated to decide upon the principles of Israel's heritage. Justice Elon dissents 
on two major points regarding the law's activation: firstly, he is of the opinion that the legislator did 
not enhance the role of analogy in the judicial process: 
I see no need in explicitly declaring the analogy as a source of law ... for it is 
the "bread and butter" of the judge in his day to day judgments ... and there-
fore, claiming that analogy is one of the sources of law delineated in the 
Foundations of Law Act appears to be redundant, 
EWN, supra note 17, at 232-233. Therefore, Elon views the principles of Israel's heritage as the only 
supplementary source provided by the Foundations of Law Act. Secondly, he broadens the scope of 
the law's performance. The law is not limited to the area of lacuna, rather the issue at hand is open to 
various interpretations and the source from which the proper interpretation must be examined must 
first and foremost stem from Jewish law (acc. to Elon's interpretation of 'Israel's heritage') as Jewish 
law is the supplementary source of law of the Israeli legal system; see Elon, "Israeli Law and its 
Place in Israeli Jurisprudence," 1968,25 Hapraklit 27. For further cases examining this law, see 
Shefer v. State of Israel, 1993, (not yet in print); Szerszevsky v. Prime Minister,1991, (VI) 45 P.O. 
779; Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, 1988, (II) 42 P.O. 221; Adras v. Harlows G.M.B.H., 
1988, (I) 42 P.O. 221; Insurance Corporation of England v. State of Israel, 1985, (II) 41 P.O. 309. 
21. G. Tedeschi, On Dispositive Law (Ius Dispositivum), 15 IYUNEI MISHPAT 5, 13 (1990): 
"The Israeli legal system does not permit the existence of lacunae by granting the judge the 
prerogative of refusing to pronounce judgment claiming non liquet. The Foundations of Law Act, 
1980 obligates the judge to find a solution to every legal problem." SCHERECHEVSKY, supra note 17 
at 380, claims on the basis of the authoritative nature of Art reinforces this claim. 46 of the Palestine 
Order-in-Council "that this is obligatory law and not merely used for comparative purposes or only 
according to the judge's discretion," supra note 17, at 380. For a dissenting opinion, see MENACHEM, 
supra note 17, who interprets the law as requiring mere counsel and not obedience. See also BARAK, 
supra note 20, critique of Ben Menachem's opinion where he concurs with Justice Elon's position in 
Handels which states that "the supplementary law is not merely a suggestion directed towards the 
7
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Essentially, the judicial task of 'filling in the gaps' of the legal system 
existed prior to this act via Art. 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 
1922-1947?2 Art. 46 was thereby repealed and replaced with the 
Foundations of Law Act. However, in addition to formalizing under 
Israeli law the act of filling lacunae and replacing English common law 
and the doctrines of equity with the principles of Israel's heritage as a 
supplementary source of Israeli law,23 the inclusion of analogy (notably 
excluded in Art. 46?4 as an additional and moreover, primary 
supplementary source is of great import. 25 
It is unnecessary to stress the powerful tool that analogy is in the face of 
lacunae. It is an all-encompassing corpus of comparative law which can 
reject virtually all claims of non liquet in the case of lacuna and 
compounded with the subsequent obligation of implementing the 
principles of Israel's heritage. In the rare event of unsatisfactory analogy, 
the Israeli judge is effectively barred from refusing to pronounce 
judgment. 26 
judge. It is law that the judge is required to apply. Once a lacuna is revealed, the judge is obligated to 
refer to the supplementary law in order to fill the lacuna." 
22. See generally G. Tedeschi, Lacunae in the Law and Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-
Council, in STUDIES IN ISRAELI LAW 132 (1959); A. LEVONTIN AND C.H. GOLDWATER, CONFLICT 
OF LAW IN ISRAEL AND ART. 46 OF THE PALESTINE COUNCIL-IN-ORDER (1974); I. ZAMIR, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN ISRAEL AND ART. 46 OF THE PALESTINE COUNCIL-IN-ORDER 
(1974). 
23. The concept of supplementary sources appears in Foundations of Law Act, supra note 17, 
Art. I, under the heading: "Supplementary Sources of Law." This pronouncement thereby 
potentially elevates the status of Israel's heritage. The actual weight of this supplementary source 
established is dependent upon the relationship one determines between analogy and the principles of 
Israel's heritage. H.H. Cohn prefers the interpretation of 'residuary sources' to supplementary 
sources, which connotes a more periphery implementation of the principles of Israel's heritage 
(which is what Cohn identifies as residuary law) as merely guiding principles in the judicial process. 
Legislation does not enhance these principles for they are "etched in the heart of every judge" and 
suitably find natural habitat "in the trends of the Jewish and democratic state of today." (COHN, 
supra note 17, 295. This position is in practice quite similar to that of Ben Menachem and, 
essentially, deviates only in semantics. 
24. See Tedeschi, supra note, 22 at 149-152. 
25. As aforesaid, this statement is in line with Barak's interpretation delineated above (supra 
note 20), as opposed to those of Ben Menachem, Cohn, Elon, Shochetman, and Schereschevsky. 
Barak terms the distinction between the fust stage (analogy examination) and the second stage 
(Israel's heritage examination) in the two-tier process with the former as a homogeneous 
supplementary source, i.e., via a process which is domestic to the legal culture, and as that of the 
latter as a heterogeneous source; however, herein lays the difficulty. For although the principles of 
Israel's heritage are not included per se among the complex of the Israeli legal system, these 
principles are certainly not foreign to it. Barak distinguishes between the principles, which he 
decides as the philosophical orientation or outlook, and not the individual normative application of 
specific law. A. Barak, Gaps in the Law and the Israeli Experience, 20 MISHPATlM 281,319-315 
(1991). 
26. This position is compatible with the existing trend in expanding judicial powers (see 
generally A. PORAT ED., JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1993). Of the opinion that resolving disputes is the 
primary task of the judge, Barak claims it would be antithetical "for the judge to refrain from passing 
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II. THE PROBLEM IN CANON LAW AND INT'L LAW 
What is the position of the judge in canon law? Is he free to follow the 
dictates of his conscience and, accordingly, to refuse to adjudicate 
whenever he is unable to reach a clear opinion as to the right of the 
parties? That answer is no. In canon law, he may not refrain from 
pronouncing judgment, his functions are not optional and within thirty 
days from the day when the hearing is concluded, he has to decide either 
in favour or against the claim (Can. 1710). 
If he is unable to reach the required moral certainty, due either to judicial 
or to factual doubt, he has to seek that certainty with the help of the 
supplementary means offered by the canon law. Should those means 
prove insufficient, he must dismiss the claim as insufficiently proved; so 
that in fact the defendant will emerge released from the liability alleged 
against him. 27 
In the case of legal lacuna, the judge must pronounce and cannot refuse 
to pass sentence pleading the silence or the obscurity or the insufficiency 
of the law.28 Thus, Canon 1608 provides that no judge may refuse to 
adjudicate by reason or inability to find direct guidance in the text of the 
law: the canon code clearly defines the judge's position, and in such 
cases it gives him legislative powers.29 
judgment in a situation of uncertainness which stems from unclarity or multiple possibilities in the 
interpretation of the statute" A. Barak, "On the Outlook of Law and Judgment and Judicial 
Activism" (supra), 15. This is in line with Barak's personal belief that the judiciary must be handed 
the task of preventing social chaos: "Where there is no judge - there is no justice. The land is filled 
with justice (Psalms); similarly, the land is filled with courts of law. There lie no areas devoid of 
law, for in lawlessness, exists the 'law' of 'might makes right' (or kol d'alim gvar Babylonian Talmud, 
Baba Batra, 34, b.)." (supra), 31. With specific regards to the Foundations of Law Act, Y.M. Edrei 
disagrees with Barak's legal theory of legal development claiming that the theory does not properly 
heed to the legislator's intentions. Edrei posits that Barak's theory, failing to view the supplementary 
sources of law in terms of sources for judicial interpretation, will lead to the dangerous result of 
unrestrained judicial power. A legal theory lacking defined sources of law, claims Edrei, is likely to 
spurn judgments based on personal discretion, that are not anchored in statute as was witnessed in 
Yardor v. Director of Election Committee, 1965, (III) 19 P.O. 36 or Electric Company Ltd. v. 
Ha'aretz, 1978, (III) 32 P.O. 337. Edrei's position, expanding the Foundations of Law Act's usage 
beyond lacunae to include legal sources or interpretation seems to be parallel to Elon's 
aforementioned position. 
27. See F. Della Rocca, "Sentenza (Diritto Canonico)", 1969, 16 NND1, 1104. Canon 18694 
provides that if a judge cannot reach (moral) certainty (through factual evidence), he must pronounce 
unproved the plaintiffs claim and release the defendant. See A. Jullien, luges et Avocats des 
Tribunaux de I'Eg/ise (Rome), 1970,471 ff. 
28. See W. Onclin, "Les Lacunes de la Loi en Droit anonique" Le Probleme des Lacunes, op. 
cit. at p. 181 ff. (esp. p. 186); see also A. van Hove, De Legibus Ecclesiasticis (Rome, Malines), 
1930,321. 
29. See R. Naz, "Juge", 1957,6 Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique col. 205 ff.; see also A. 
Jullien, op. cit. at p. 471 ff. "When the judge cannot reach moral certainty - a rare possibility - he 
must judge, but in accordance to Canon 1869,4. The judge ... is evertheless obliged to pronounce, 
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Where a court composed of several judges is confronted with a matter of 
factual doubt, the matter is decided by a majority vote. In the 
exceptional case of a vote divided among an even number of judges, the 
decision falls according to the principle actor non probante, reus 
absolvitur. Unless the Ordinary dismisses the judges and appoints a 
substitute collegiate chamber.30 
The question of non liquet also arises in international law. Although the 
principle of non liquet in itself is generally rejected, opinions are not 
unanimous. Municipal law, as we have seen sometimes offers the judges 
some method, either internal or external, to fill a possible lacuna. But 
what about a system like that of international law, with its limited 
number of norms, where the recourse to analogy and to general implicit 
principles is not admitted, and whose judges are not allowed to 
adjudicate in equity without the explicit agreement of the parties? To this 
question, which has repeatedly been raised. 31 some have pondered 
whether the international judge should not be empowered to declare sibi 
non liquet in the absence of a suitable norm. 32 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the principle rejecting non 
liquet, not unknown in certain norms of international legal dispositions33 
is so deeply rooted in modern legal conscience that it should be 
considered to apply even in internationallaw.34 
because his is a public function from which he cannot exempt himself'. See also: M. Falco, 
Introduzione allo Studio del Codex Juris Canonici (Torino), 1925, 103-4 and FJ. Connel, "Reflex 
Principles", 1966, 12 New Catholic Encyclopaedia 169. 
30. F. della Rocca, "Sentenza" op. cit.; R. Naz, "Juge" op. cit. col. 203 ff. (I have been unable 
to obtain the recent volume by L. Musselli, II Concetto di Giudicato neUe Fonti Storiche del Diritto 
Canonico (dalle origini al secolo XVII) (Padova), 1972. 
31. J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (London), 1954, 153 If.; J. Stone, "Non 
Liquet and the function of Law in the International Community", 1959, British Yearbook of 
International Law 124 et seq.; J. Stone, "Non Liquet and the International Judicial Function" in Le 
Probleme des Lacunes op. cit. p. 3304 ff.; I. Tammelo, "On the logical Openness of Legal Orders, 
1959, 8 Am. L Compo L 187 ff. 
32. It must be stressed that the two questions oflegal lacunae and of non liquet, while they are 
strictly interconnected, are nevertheless two separate issues: a case of non liquet is perfectly possible 
without any lacuna in law, as has been clearly shown especially by P. Reuter, Droit International 
Public (Paris), 1958,303. 
33. See, for instance, Art. 42 2 of the Convention for the regulation of controversies relating to 
investment between States, providing that Le Tribunal ne peut refuser de juger sous pretexte du 
silence ou de l'obscurite du droit (The courts cannot refuse to pass sentence owing to the silence or 
the obscurity of the law"): on this point see especially JJ.A. Salmon, Quelques Observations sur 
Lacunes en Droit International Public" in Le Probleme des Lacunes, op. cit. pp. 313-330. 
34. See in this particular aspect H. Lauterpacht, "Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non 
Liquet and the Completeness of the Law" Symbolae Verzijl (The Hague), 1958, 197 If.; Idem, 
International Law (Cambridge), 1970,96 (this thesis was particularly attacked by J. Stone, in his 
essays cited supra, n. 21. 
10
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 10 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/2
2004] NON LIQUET 11 
In this respect the question also arises of the completeness of the 
international law. Obviously this question makes no sense for a supporter 
of the principle of non liquet; but, as held by Kelsen, the general rule that 
whatever is not expressly prohibited is implicitly permitted probably 
extends to international law. "He who assumes that in such a case the 
existing law cannot be applied ignores the fundamental principle that 
what is not legally forbidden to the subject of the law is legally permitted 
to them."35 Consequently, if anyone of the above arguments is accepted 
as valid, the question of non liquet in international law will not differ 
substantially from that under municipallaw.36 Indeed the main supporter 
of allowing non liquet in international law before discussing "the Meta-
Legal aspects of the Problem," stated in advance, " ... though the debate 
has proceeded as if the question was whether a non liquet was admissible 
as a matter of law, de lege lata, the more correct level may rather be in 
terms of whether a non liquet should be admissible de lege ferenda."37 
III. GROUNDS FOR REJECTING NON LIQUET IN MODERN 
SYSTEMS 
What are the reasons for rejecting non liquet? What is the basis of the 
judge's duty to pass judgment in all cases, to adjudicate, even ifthis may 
be at the expense of truth?38 
This is justified by the argument that in every case, regardless of its 
complexity, the law must find a definite solution and determine 
accurately the rights of the parties. Del Vecchio in his General Principles 
of Law has adequately expressed this.39 There is no source of friction 
among men and no possible controversy; however complicated or 
unforeseen, that is not only susceptible of a definite judicial solution, but 
35. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York), 1952,3306; see also B. Akzin, 
"Kelsen - in Memoriam", 1973, 8 Is. LR. 325. On the completeness of International Law see also A. 
PierisereniI, Diritto Internazionale (Milano), 1956, vol. I, p. 98 ff. 
36. See N. Bobbio, Les Lacunes op. cit. at p. 423 et seq. 
37. J. Stone, Legal Controls ... op. cit. supra n. 20 at p. 153 ff.; see also n. I, p. 153, stressing 
the difference between non liquet in Roman Law and in International law: The modern meaning of 
the term is thus different from that in Roman law, where the term 'non liquet' originated. It there 
referred either to the mere deferment of a decision pending further information, or the personal non-
participation of a particular member of the tribunal in the decision. Though these situations could 
arise internationally, the situation debated on the modern 'non liquet' involves a full non possumus of 
the tribunal, the refusal to decide being both absolute and institutional." On the problem as it arose 
in Roman law see infra. Text at n. 344 ff. For the position in Jewish law, see text at n. 76 ff. 
38. For some observations on the functions of the judge, the affinities and differences between 
the functions of the judge and those of the historian, together with some remarks on "judicial truth", 
see S. Ginossar, "Preuve Judiciaire" Encyclopaedia Universalis; see also H. Levy-Bruhl, La Preuve 
Judiciaire op. cit. supra n. 4 at p. 14 ff. 
39. Translated by F. FORTE (Boston), 1956; the original edition was published as "Sui 
Principi GeneraIi del Diritto" 1921,Archivio Giuridico, F. Serafini 85. 
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in fact demands it. No statement demonstrates so adequately the 
eminently practical nature of law or its full and perfect relation to life. 
Great doubt and uncertainty may well persist in the theoretical aspects of 
law, for every branch of knowledge (including Jurisprudence as a 
theoretical science) has always presented questions which have remained 
unsolved to the present day, although they have been discussed for 
centuries. 
But to the question Quid iuris? (What are the limits to my rights and 
those of others?) In every concrete case there must be an answer, which 
may be certainly open to criticism, but is at least definitive in practice. 
Our present juristic system conforms to this exigency of practical justice 
by withholding from the magistrate the power to deny final judgment "on 
any pretext, even silence, obscurity, contradiction or insufficiency of the 
law." He must dispose of all cases of transgression with such appropriate 
civil or penal remedies as each may require. 40 
Another question then arises, relating to the nature of the judge's duty. It 
should be noted that this duty may extend beyond the terms of the 
plaintiff's claim, as when the latter is not legitimately entitled to sue and 
the judge is nevertheless bound to "decide not to decide", and to declare 
himself incompetent. This would indicate that the judge's duty is not 
necessarily that of determining the rights of the parties. 
40. Ibid, p. 1 ff.; we also quote n. I, p. 6; "This does not arise from Juridical megalomania' 
(juristischer Grossenwahn), as was the opinion of H. U. Kantorowitz (Gnaeus Flavius, Der Kampf 
urn die Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg), 1906, 17, but from the practical necessity that each one 
must, in a certain way, coordinate his own behavior with that of others. This is the essential basis or 
concept of law. A system of law which, though able to solve some problems in life, should prove 
itself incapable of solving all others would nUllify itself ipso facto, since it fails in its primary 
function - that of creating order among human beings (hominis ad hominem proportio - the relation 
of man to man). Only in this practical sense is a jurist obliged to reach a conclusion regarding each 
question presented him; a line of demarcation between the lawful and the unlawful, between the 
exigible in the facts, ebus ipsis dictantibus et humanis necessitatibus (the facts themselves and 
human necessities being decisive); and the jurist must in the end recognize it. If the biologist, the 
philologist and the historian confess their inability to solve all the problems pertaining to their 
respective sciences, this is not because they are more modest than the jurist (as H.U. Kantorowitz, 
loc. cit., hints), but rather because limits and doubts in theoretical knowledge do not suspend the 
progress of life. When instead, as in legal science, one seeks to regulate human actions effectively, 
science merges to some extent with the necessarily continuous course of these actions, and, 
therefore, cannot fail to accompany them with its judgments, which are, however, only of immediate 
practical value. While it is indeed true that in its theoretical range jurisprudence also has doubtful 
points, its age-old problems, and can ad infinitum doctrinally debate even res iudicatae; nevertheless 
each new controversy, as it arises, although it may involve points scientifically unclarified, bears 
with it the concomitant necessity of the issuance of a judgment that will be definite and certain and 
which will have practical finality". 
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Carnelutti's doctrine,41 which distinguishes between the judge's duty to 
the litigants and his duty to the State, seems most acceptable: "The State, 
having appointed the judge, lays upon him the obligation to judge the 
controversy at the request of the parties, who are in fact exactly in the 
situation of the third party, favoured in a contract made without their 
direct participation. "42 
To conclude, in modern legal systems the Judge cannot consider -- as is 
often done at will by the scientist -- that his opinion is not sufficiently 
clear, refusing, on this ground, to pass judgment. In civil affairs, he is 
imperatively ordered, under pain of severe sanctions, to find within the 
law the solution of the controversy submitted to his judgment. In 
criminal matters, he must either convict or acquit. At most he may, 
should he claim to be insufficiently enlightened, demand some additional 
information. But this is only a short reprieve. He must adjudicate.43 
IV. THE QUESTIONS OF NON LIQUET IN ROMAN LAW 
If we stop to consider the position of the judge who is but a human being, 
riddled with doubts and uncertainties, we must first recognize that 
sometimes, on rare occasions, he may find himself, not as an institution 
but a person, confronted with grave problems of conscience. For 
example, when he would rather refrain from applying the general 
principle onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit (see Digesta 22.3.21) 
directing him to reject the claim of the plaintiff for no other reason than 
the latter's inability to adduce sufficient evidence. Although he may 
appear to be a perfectly upright and honest person. 
Is there a legal system that takes the plight of the judge into 
consideration? 
To answer this question we shall briefly examine the same position in 
Roman law, Jewish law and in Moslem law. The well known procedure 
followed under Roman law in civil actions involving the trial of a claim 
brought by one party against an opponent was divided into two separate 
stages: the fIrst one (in iure) took place before the magistrate, generally 
the praetor, in his court of law, the second (apud iudicem) before a judge 
41. Diritto e Processo (Napoli, undated) 118 ff. in the series Trattato del Processo Civile: 
"Obbligo del Giudice" and "Obbligo del Giudice e Diritto della Parte". 
42. See also G. Chiovenda, Principi del Diritto Processuale Civile (Napoli), 1928, 43 ff., 
according to whom the action is an authoritative right. On the differences between the functions of 
the arbitrator and those of the judge, see ibid. at p. J08; on submission to arbitration by agreement, 
see F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni del Processo Civile Italiano vol. I, p. 68. 
43. H. Levy-Bruhl, Aspects sociologiques du Droit (Paris), 1955, 114 ff. 
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or judges, being generally a private person or persons selected by the 
parties or taken from a list of registered judges. 44 
This division of the procedure into two stages (in iure-apud iudicem) was 
characteristic of the civil procedure in Roman law throughout the period 
of ordo iudiciorum privatorum, i.e., in the ancient procedure per 
formulas45 • It disappeared only in the cognitio extra ordinem, in which 
the procedure is carried out entirely before the magistrate. During the 
fIrst stage, it was customary to state the issues; in the second, the judge, 
having heard the evidence, judged and pronounced sentence.46 
While the Institutions of Gaius contain many details concerning the fIrst 
stage of the procedure, giving us a clear picture of the legis actiones, the 
formulae and the prerogatives of the praetor, only little, if anything, is 
said about the second stage. Thus little is known about the duties of the 
judge (officium iudicis). 47 
An essay, De officio iudicis by Q. Elio Tubero, a lawyer of the last 
century of the Republic dedicated to the lay judge (iudex)48 which might 
have thrown light on this subject has regrettably not been preserved. 
What now is the attitude of Roman law towards a magistrate when in 
doubt? In the Digest we find the distinction between judicial and factual 
doubt: 
44. On this point, see in particular V. Arangio-Ruiz, Istituzioni di Dirino Romano (Naples, 
14th ed.), 1960, 112. F. La Rosa has recently confirmed that the selection of judges was not a matter 
of Cree private choice, but was limited by the lists of persons in the album iudicum, without claiming, 
however, to have found any explicit evidence of this custom: "La formula dell' Actio ludicati 
(Contributo allo studio dei poteri del Iudex)" St. Grosso vol. 4, 1971, 240 ff.; contra see G. Pugliese, 
Il Processo Civile Romano vol. 2 - Jl Processo Formulare Part I. (Milano), 1963, 228 et seq., and 
also 235 ff., and A. Biscardi, Lezioni sui Processo Romano Antico e Classico (Torino), 1968, 118 ff. 
and 410-11; A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia), 1953, 359, s.v. 
"album iudicum"; and finally, P. Collinet, "Le Role des Juges dans la Formation du Droit Romain 
Classique", 1936, Capitolium 5 ff. (reprint). 
45. On this point, see H.P. Jolowicz, "Procedure in lure and Apud Iudicem. A Suggestion." 
Afti Congresso Bologna, 1935, vol. II. p. 57 ff. (non vidi); H.R. Hoetink, "The Origin of the Dual 
Mode in Roman Procedure," 1947,55 Seminar 16 et seq.; H. Felix Jolowicz, "The Iudex and the 
arbitral Principle", 1949,2 RIDA 477 ff. (=Mel. De Visscher). 
46. For some comparative remarks between Roman and English procedure, see A. Engelmann 
and Others, A History of Continental Civil Procedure (Boston), 1927, 269 ff.; W.W. Buckland and 
A. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (Cambridge), 1936,315 ff.; see also M. Cappelletti and 
J. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (The Hague), 1965, 26 ff. 
47. See justification in G.I. Luzzatto, Ii Problema d'origine del processo extra ordinem 
(Bologna), 1965, 105. 
48. F. Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 2nd ed.), 1953,94. With regard to the 
term officium see G. Cervenca, "Sull'uso del termine officium nella legislazione post classica-
giustinianea" St. Grosso, 1970, vol. 3, p. 206 ff. with bibliography. 
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when the Judges claim the existence of judicial doubts, 
the praesides answer them. In the case of factual doubt 
praesides must abstain from advising, but should instruct 
them to pronounce according to their conscience; for in 
such cases the advice might be detrimental to justice and 
conducive to favoritism or self-seeking.49 
15 
Ulpianus explains that the praesides should serve as the magistrates' 
referees in case of judicial doubt, in which case they will instruct the 
judge to pronounce sentence according to the imperatives of religio 
(iudex ex conscientia iudicare debet) is expressly stated by Gotofred); 
while (the text continues) any attempt to influence the judge in the 
examination of factual evidence is an abominable distortion of justice 
and may result in unjust sentences or even in dishonesty. Although this 
passage carries, we might say, a certain Justinianaean flavour (especially 
the appeal to the judge's conscience, religio), its substance, with its clear 
distinction between factual and judicial doubt, bears the mark of the 
classical jurist. 50 
The passage refers to the provincial magistrate, who may have been 
expected to have had greater difficulties in finding the law, we may 
nevertheless assume that the function of the Roman judge was also not 
free from problems: indeed Arangio-Ruiz brilliantly writes that "the 
function of the private judge should not be considered limited to the 
solution of factual questions, as if judicial questions were already 
implicitly solved in the formula."51 Therefore, the magistrate may find 
49. D. 5.11.79.1: "Iuddicibus de iure dubitandibus praesides respondere solent: de facto 
consulentibus non debent praesides consilium impartire, verum iubere eos prout religio suggerit 
sententiam proferre: haec enim res nonnumquam infamat et materiam gratiae vel ambitionis tribuit." 
50. It would appear that we concur neither with the excessive criticism of G. Beseler, who 
considers the whole phase from the word solvent to the end, as an interpolation ("Romanisstische 
Studien", 1930, 50 ZSS 33), nor with A. Dell'Oro, who discards the point altogether: I [ibri de 
Officio nella Giurispridenza Romana (Milano), 1960, 142; see also the accurate remarks by 
Dell'Oro, ibid, n. 157. On this passage see also: TH. Mommsen, "Aegyptischer Erbschaftsprozess 
vom J. 135", 1893, 14 ZSS 6; E. Weiss, Recitatio und Responsum im romischer Provinzialprozess, 
ein Beitrag rum Gerichtsgebrauch", 1912,33 ZSS 238; F. Vassalli, "Miscellanea Critica di Diritto 
Romano n, Ius e Factum Contrapposti come Oggetto di Conoscenza", 1914, annaali Perugia 
(=Scrritti Giuridici Vol. ill, 1, p. 388) who also argues successfully that the last part of the sentence 
(from haec enim res to the end) has been interpolated; B. Biondi, "Appunti intorno alia Sentenza nel 
Processo Civile Romano", in St. Bonfante, Vol. 4,1930,45 and 68; A. Steinwenter, "Rhetoric und 
romischer Zivilprozess", ,1947, 65 ZSS 88; M. Kaser, "Beweislast und Verrnutung in romischer 
Formularprozess" ,1954, 71 ZSS, 232, quoting G. Donatuti'S essays - which we have been unable to 
obtain; idem. "Infamia und Ignominia in den romischer Rechtsquellen", 1956,73 ZSS 231. 
51. From "Istituzioni" op. cit. at pp. 138-9; see also G. Broggini, "La Prova nel Processo 
Romano Arcaico", 1960, II Ius (=Coniectanea, 1966, 167 n. 90). 
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himself confronted with doubts and, if the evidence produced appears to 
be insufficient he may be unable to form a clear opinion. 52 
Lemosse writes, "... as for himself, the judge pronounces according to 
his personal conviction .... The outcome of the trial, therefore, depends 
neither upon the credibility of the witnesses, nor upon the arguments 
presented", although he recognizes that "serious reasons were required in 
order to discard any evidence." 
Aulus Gellius intimates that in the final analysis, conscience is not the 
only norm. In one word: the Romans waver between the necessity to 
respect evidence, whose value must prevail upon arbitrary choice, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the desire to protect the freedom of the 
judge, which is often the only defense against the roguery of certain 
litigants. This is why the iudex is given free scope of action to a point 
bordering upon denial of justice. "53 
But how should the judge behave if he has been unable to form such an 
unequivocal opinion? May he not then honestly claim that the case is not 
clear to him (sibi non liquere)?54 Aulus Gellius, a writer who died circa 
130 AD, tells us about an interesting case that occurred during his term 
of service as a civil court judge. "A sum of money was claimed before 
52. On evidence see especially: J.P. Levy, "La Formation de la Theorie Romaine des Preuves" 
St. Solazzi, 1948,418 ff.; E. Levy, "Beweislast im Klassischen Recht", 1952, 3 Iura 155 ff.; M. 
Kaser, "Beweilast und Vermutung" op. cit. at p. 221 et seq.; O. Pugliese, "L'Onere della Prova nel 
Processo per formulas", 1956,3 RIDA 349 ff.; J.A. Arias Bonet, "Prueba Testificial y Obvagulatio 
en el Antiguo Derecho Romano", St De Francisci, 1956, vol. 1, p. 283 ff.; O. Longo, "L'Onere della 
Prova nel Processo Civile Romano" ,1960, 11 lura 149 ff.; O. Broggini, "La Prova nel Processo 
Romano Arcaico" op. cit. at p. 133 ff.; OJ. Luzzatto, II Problema d'Origine del Processo "extra 
ordinem" vol. I, op. cit. at pp. 106-D7. We do not wish to take a stand in the controversy between J.P. 
Levy, E. Levy, M. Kaser on the one hand, and O. Pugliese and G. Broggini, on the other, concerning 
the existence of rules of evidence. OJ. Luzzatto, after full examination, sustains the traditional 
opinion, according to which, while no strict norms of evidence can be assumed, there existed 
common sense rules generally and customarily acknowledged in practice; see on this point E. Cuq, 
Manue1882; "the theory of evidence is the fruit of the rectors' work rather than of case-law", affirms 
LemOSSSE, "Cognitio - Etude sur Ie Role du luge dans l'Instruction du Proces Civil Antique" 
(Paris), 1944, 158 ff. 
53. From "Cognitio . Etude sur Ie Role .... " op. cit. at p. 162 ff. see also B. BIONDI, "Appunti 
intorno alIa Sentenza nel Processo Civile Romano" St. Bonfante vol. 4, p. 34 ff. (=Studi Biondi vol. 
2, pp. 435 et seq.); OJ. Luzzatto, II Problema d'Origine, op. cit. at p. 109, n. 1. 
54. On non liquet especially: M.A. von Bethmann-Holwegg, Der Romische Civilprozess, 
1864, vol. I, p. 182 ff.; Keller-Wach, Der Romische Civilprozess und die Actionen, 1883,338; C. 
Bertolini, Appunti Didattici di Diritto Romano (Torino), 1914, vol. I., p. 314, and vol. 2, p. 152; E. 
Costa, Profiilo Storico del Processo Civile Romano (Roma), 1918,76; L. Wenger, lnstitutionen des 
Romischen Zivilprozessrechts (Munchen), 1925; F. Leonhard - E. Weisse "Non Liquet", 1926, 13 
PW-RE col. 726-7; A. Scialoia, Procedura Civile Romana (Roma), 1936, 183 ff.; M. Lemosse, 
"Cognitio - Etude ... " op. cit. at p.I64; R. Monier, Manuel Etementaire de Droit Romain (paris), 
1947, vol. I, p. 166; P. Duff, "Non Liquet", 1956,3 S.A.LR. 39 ff.; O. Pugliese, II processo civile -
op. cit., at p. 252 ff. A.H. Jones Oreenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, 1901, (New 
Reprint, New Jersey), 1971,497 ff. 
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me, which was said to have been paid and counted out; but the claimant 
did not show this by documents or witnesses, but relied upon very 
slender argument. "55 The case was made even more delicate because the 
plaintiff was a person of undoubted rectitude. It was clear, however, that 
he was "a thoroughly good man of well known and tested integrity and 
of blameless life,"56 while the defendant was a person of dubious 
character. "The man upon whom the claim was made was shown to be of 
no substance, of base and evil life, often convicted of lying, and full of 
treachery and fraud."57 In view of the plaintiffs incapacity to bring 
evidence in support of his claim, the defendant not only insisted on his 
own release, but also demanded that the plaintiff be condemned de 
calumnia.58 He claimed that evidence regarding the private life of the 
parties was irrelevant to the case, for this was a case of claiming money 
before a private judge, not a question of morals inquired into by the 
censor. "59 
Gelllius' friends were persons well acquainted with the letter of the law, 
"whom I had consulted on the point" (quos regoveram in consilium), 
advised him to release the defendant, applying thus the common sense 
norm later adopted as a rule, by which actore non probante reus 
absolvitur, and this should doubtlessly have been the normal behaviour.60 
55. Petebatur apud me pecunia, quae dicebatur data numerataque, sed qui petebat neque tabulis 
neque testibus id factum docebat et argumentis admodum exilibus nitebatur (Noctes Atticae, XlV, 2, 
4). 
56. Virum esse firme bonom notaque et. expectae fidei et vitae inculpatissimae ... (Ibid). 
57. . .. non bonae rei vitaeque turpi et surdida convictumque vulgo in mendaciis plerumque esse 
perfidum et fraudum ostendebatur (Ibid). 
58. "If a defendant was sued maliciously, the plaintiff having full knowledge that his claim for 
a tenth of the amount claimed in the former trial, but he had to prove that the latter acted calumnniae 
causa". Sic A. Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary op. cit., at p. 520. It may be noted here that 
recently it has become more and more vital to introduce norms of loyalty and integrity of the parties 
and their legal representatives in court, "and especially the introduction of a pledge of loyalty 
(obbligo di verita) by the party (and his representative) not to adduce facts it knows to be false, and 
not to contest facts (adduced by the adversary) it knows to be true. A pledge of this sort was known 
to the classical Roman tribunal, together with institutions aimed at preventing acts of reciprocal 
deception and cheating (M. Cappelletti, Processo e ldeologie (Bologna), 1969,216 ff.; nevertheless, 
there remain other serious dangers, as noted by E. Redenti, "L'Umanita nel Nuovo Processo Civile", 
1941, 18 Rivista di Diritto Processuale Civile 30 ff.; and P. Calamandrei, Opere Giuridiche 
(Napoli), 1966, 3306 ff. and 556 ff.; see also P. Henry Winfield, The History of Conspiracy and 
Abuse of Legal Procedure, 1921; S. Ginossar, "Nuisance Between Litigants" ,1970, 2 Mishpatim 221 
ff. and 553 ff. 
59. " ... res enim de petunda pecunia apud iudicem privatum agi, non apud censorem de 
moribus", Gellius, N.A. XIV, 2, 8). See A. Berger, Encyclopaedic Dictionary op. cit., at p. 352 and 
E. Volterra, 1963,9 NND1344. 
60. Therefore we disagree with J.P. Levy, "A Formation de la Theorie Romaine des Preuves" 
op. cit. at p. 420 n. 10, when he affirms that Gellius was unable to find (in the law) a solution to the 
problem of burden of proof, and was forced to seek it in a purely pragmatical work (one of Cato's 
addresses). In fact Gellius was conscious that what his advisors suggested was the general principle, 
which however did not satisfy his conscience in that specific case; on this see mainly G. Pug;oese, 
"L'Onere della Prova" op. cit. at p. 356 and n. 6. 
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The proposed solution seemed indisputable, yet Gellius could not bring 
himself to adopt it and to disregard the enormous reliability gap between 
the parties; and this doubt caused him to turn for additional advice to the 
philosopher Favorinus. 
The latter, after a lengthy lecture on the duties of a judge, refers to the 
precedent of Cicero (first half of the 2nd century BC) that in case of 
conflicting evidence, the personalities of the parties must be taken in due 
consideration: if they are equally honest - or equally dishonest - then the 
judge must pronounce in favour of the defendant: but if only one of the 
parties is reliable, then the judge must give sentence in his favour. 
Favorinus therefore advised in the present case to admit the plaintiffs 
claim and to condemn the defendant, basing himself on the principle qui 
petit melior est.61 
Gellius, who was then in his youth, was convinced by the moral justice 
of Favorinus' speech,62 but nevertheless was still unable to judge on the 
basis of the behavior of the parties, without the support of evidence (de 
probationibus rei gestae) and unwilling as he was to release the 
defendant, he decided to declare himself unable to reach a clear opinion, 
thereby relieving himself of the obligation to pronounce judgment (et 
propterea iuravi mihi non liquere, atque ita iudicatu illo solutus sum). 63 
From this episode we learn that the magistrate did his utmost to reach a 
decision that would satisfy both justice and his own conscience; having 
weighed the evidence and considered the personality of the parties he 
turned to the advice of his consilium and that of a philosopher; his final 
decision iurare sibi non liquere was clearly not reached lightly, but with 
full cognizance of his responsibility as a judge. Therefore, although he 
61. On this passage, and especially on this point, see H. Levy-Bruhl, Recherches sur les 
Actions de la Loi, (Paris), 1960, 216-218; by the same author see also his review of A. Cecchini, in, 
1928,7 RH 116-7 and "Dissentiones Prudentium" in Synt V. Agrangio-Ruiz, 1964, vol. I, pp. 537 -8. 
62. From the episode it appears that Gellius, and not Favorinus, had been appointed iudex, and 
that the decision sibi non-liquere was that of Gellius not of Favorinus, contrary to what E. Volterra 
writes (Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Roma), 1961, 235) "cio risulta da un episodio narrato da 
Gellio, Noc. Att.14.2.25, intorno ad un processo in cui era stato noninato iudex il filosofo Favorino" 
this appears from an episode told by Gelluis - Att. Nights, 14.2.25 - about a trial in which the 
philosopher Favorinus had been appointed iudex). 
63. "And therefore I swore 'mihi non liquere', and was thus delivered from the duty to 
pronounce". In addition to the authors mentioned in n. 43, see also C. Bertolini, II Giuranmento nel 
Diritto Romano (Torino), 1886, 177. M. Lemosse op. cit., sees in Gellius' words a justification of his 
attitude: "this passage shows the reason for the attitude adopted by the iudex. A powerful man whose 
integrity was beyond suspicion could well judge regardless of the strict norms ofthe law, because no 
one would have dared to suspect him of having acted by self-interest or bias". 
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was unable to pronounce sentence, he cannot be censured for failing to 
pass judgment of the case.64 
On the basis of Gellius' chronicle it is common opinion today65 that 
during the period of ordo iudiciorum privatorum66 the iudex was allowed 
to declare sibi non liquere,67 in which case the case had to be rearrayed. 68 
Did this custom outlive the ordo iudiciorum privatorum? Lemosse does 
not suppose so. "But this oath non sibi liquere disappears from later 
sources: subsequently to further changes in the procedure, Justinianean 
compilations mention it only indirectly ... It is therefore natural that the 
oath sibi non liquere should have disappeared with the ordo iudiciorum, 
as it had not made its appearance before the creation of this ordo.69 
Regretfully, there is little source material, which could give us the 
answer. Looking, ftrst of all, at Justinian's Digest, we must keep in mind 
its particular character. In spite of the many interpolations and 
manipulations of its compilers, the Digest remains in substance a 
collection of fragments borrowed from classical jurists. This explains 
flrst how, unlike the Codex and the Novelle, two explicitly normative 
works, the Digest has at the same time a normative and a scholastic and 
doctrinarian function, with the latter clearly prevailing over the former; 70 
64. See G. Pugliese: II Processo Civile Romano ... op. cit., vol. 2, p. 253: the obligation to 
judge did not necessarily entail the obligation to actually solve the controversy. 
65. Nevertheless, see F. Schuiz: Classical Roman Law (Oxford), 1951, 14: "In civi, unlike 
criminal procedure it is not permissible to pronounce non liquet". Schulz refers to the Romische 
Strafrecht by Th Mommsen, in which, however, the author does not deal with the question of non-
liquet in the framework of civil procedure. Against Schulz's opinion, and in favor of W.W. 
Buckland's and H.F. Jolowicz's, see P. Duff; "Non Liquet" op. cit. supra n. 4. 
66. With explicit reference to legis actiones, see G. Franciosi, II Processo di Liberta in Diritto 
Romano (Napoli), 1961,68 ff.; contra, see M. Marrone in his review of Franciosi's essay in, 1962, 
13 Iura 262; pro, see G. Pugliese: "Processo Civile Romano" vol. I, p. 422, ff. (non vidi) and M. 
Kaser, Romischen Zivilprocezessrecht op.cit. at p. 88 n. 3; see also M. Mole, "Sentenza (Diritto 
Romano)" NNDI p. 1085 and n.7, where however, there is no distinction between sources relating to 
civil and to criminal procedure. 
67. It may be useful to remark that Pothier introduced Gellius' passage in his Pandette, 
affirming explicitly: nevertheless, if the given Judges did not grasp the question of the case, they 
swore that it was not clear to them (sibi non liquere)" (sub. D. 5.1.79.1). 
68. On this point, see E. Costa, Profile Storico op cit. at p. 76. 
69. "Cognitio - Etude" op. cit. at pp. 164-5. 
70. On this important subject see especially: F. Pringsheim, "die Archaistische Tendenz 
Justinians" in Gesammelte Albandlungen (Heidelberg), 1961, 9 ff. and also "The Character of 
Justinian's Legislation", ibid. p. 73 ff.; F. DE Visscher, "Le Digeste, Couronnemment de la Politique 
des Empereurs vis-a -vis des Prudents", ConJerenze per it xiv Centenario delle Pandette (Milano), 
1931, 55 ff.; G.G. Archi, "II Classicismo di Giustiniano" in Giustiniano Legislatore (Bologna), 
1970,169 ff.; ibid., p. 181 ff. especially 186 ff.; "La Valutazione Critica del Corpus Iuris", ibid., p. 
206 ff.; M. Kaser, RPR, ,1969, vol. 2, p .. 20 ff.; Th. ayer-Maly, "Bemerkungen rum Autbau der 
Digesetentitel" in Synt. V. Arangio-Ruiz op.cit. at p. 884; see also GJ. Luzzatto's view of U. Ziletti's 
work, in, 1966,32 SDHI 363 ff.; and R. Bonini, "II Manuale Novellarum del Van Der Wal (con 
alcune Considerazioni sui Rapporti fra NoveJle e Digesto)" in Archivio Giuridico, 1966, vol. 171, p. 
26 est. See also K. Heinz Schindler, Justinianus Haltung zur Klassik (Koln-Graz), 1966, and reviews 
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and second, how various terms assume a thoroughly different meaning in 
classical law and in post-classical Justinian law.?1 
An outstanding example is the iudex. As already shown, in classical law 
the iudex is generally a private citizen who applies the letter of the law 
upon specific orders from the praetor as prescribed in the formula; while 
in the late cognitio extra ordinem and in Justinianean trials, the iudex is a 
magistrate, an organ of public administration, having a general potestas 
iudicandi within the limits of his competence. 
In the 17th book Ad edictum, the jurist Paul, reporting an opinion of 
Pomponius (38th book Ad edictum), writes: If in a collegial judgment 
one of the judges appointed to a civil cause declares "sibi non liquere", 
while the remaining judges reach an agreement; should he declare 
formally "sibi non liquere," the sentence pronounced by the rest of the 
college remains valid; for should the abstaining judge have openly 
dissented, yet the sentence would have been valid by majority vote.72 
We shall not question at this point the use of the term iudex - the 
classical jurist might have written recuperatoribus or centumviri instead 
of pluribus iudices?3. What appears unequivocally from this passage is 
that even in the case of a collegial judgment, a single judge had the 
option to abstain from giving a judgment if the question was not 
sufficiently clear to him, and that his abstention did not impair a sentence 
passed by a majority of the judges. This is justified by the fact that, had 
the abstaining judge voted against the adopted sentence, the other judges 
would have nonetheless been able to pronounce their sentence. There is 
yet another logical justification. In the Digest itself we find a passage by 
Celsus (D.42.11.39), asserting that in a college composed of three 
judges, two of the members cannot judge in the absence of the third, for 
they are all bound to adjudicate (quippe ornnes iudicare iussi sunt); 
however, a sentence passed by a majority against the vote of the third 
by G.G. Nem, 1969, 15 Labeo 84 ff.; G. Grosso, in, 1970, I Index, International Survey of Roman 
Law, 206 et seq.; and Th. Mayer-Maly, 1968,85 ZSS 556 ff. 
71. See especially B. Biondi, "Intomo alia Romanita del Processo Civile Romano", in Scritti 
Giuridici, op.cit. Vol. II, p. 368 ff., and especially 388; "Diritto e Processo nella Legislazione 
Giustinianea", ibid. at 519 ff.; "II Processo Civile Giustinianeo, ibid. at p. 567 ff. 
72. Si uni ex pluribus iudicibus de liberali causa cognoscenti, de re non liqueat; eaeteri autem 
consentienti, si is iuraverit sibi non liquere, EO quiescente caeteros qui consentiant sententiam 
proferre: quia etsi dissentiret, plurium sententiam obtineret (D. 42.1.36). 
73. See Index Interpolationum, col. 228; see also the corresponding passage in Basilica 9, 3, 
36. 
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judge is absolutely valid, since the basic condition "that all three judges 
must take part in the judgment" has indeed been fulfilled. 74 
Roman law is clearly based upon the assumption, explicitly mentioned 
by Marcellus (0.44.1.37), that only if all judges were present, can they 
be deemed to have taken part in the judgment; and there is a distinction 
between the judge's duty to take part in the judgment and the act of 
pronouncing sentence. 
Another passage, not directly relevant to our problem is that taken from 
Ulpianus and referring to the arbiter ex compromisso: "Also, should the 
Praetor urge him to pronounce, and should he declare that the case is not 
yet sufficiently clear him, justice requires that he be granted a delay, after 
which he will be required to pronounce."75 Not only does the passage 
refer neither to the iudex, nor to the common non liquet, but also it deals 
with a case, which is not yet clear. Far from refusing to pronounce 
sentence, the judge merely requests a postponement so that he may reach 
the degree of certainty required to form an unequivocal opinion. Apart 
from the Digest, other sources, more specifically post-classical, dealing 
with our problem, are as follows: 
In the cognitio extra ordinem a judge unable to solve the controversy, 
because of either factuaF6 or judicial doubt, may remit the decision to the 
imperial courts of law (relatio). The judge had the option of submitting to 
the Emperor a simple question of law (consultatio), upon which the case 
would be turned back to him for adjudicating, subject to a right of 
appeal, or of deferring the whole case to the Emperor. 77 
74. This principle is also found in Jewish law, where, however, contrary to the Roman system, 
it is provided that should one of the judges wish to abstain, a substitute must act in his place, in order 
to avoid a reduction of the judging college: see Mishna Sanhedrin, III, 6 and V, 5 and Rashi's 
commentary to the Sanhedrin treatise, 29 a. 
75. "Proinde si forte urgeatur a praetore ad sententiam, aequissimum erit, si iuret sibi de causa 
nondum liquere, spatium ei ad pronuntiandum dari." 
76. In this sense see E. Costa, Profilo Storieo, op. cit. at p. 153; G. Bassanelli, "La 
Legislazione Processuale di Giustino I (9 luglio 518-agosto 527)", 1971,37 SDHl1l9 ff.; "Such 
norms may be meaningful only if used to protect the parties against an imperial sentence, definitive 
for the whole matter; they would cease to be necessary if the imperial sentence were intended to 
solve exclusively a question of law" (p. 164, in Italian). 
77. On this argument see M.A. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Der Romisehe Zivilprozess op. cit. at 
p. 91; E. Costa, Profilo Storieo .... op. cit. at p. 153 et seq. E. Andt, La Procedure par E. Rescrit 
(paris), 1920, 8; P. de Francisci, "Osservazioni sulle Condizioni della Legislazione nei Secoli IV e 
V", Ser. Salandra (Milano), 1928, 141 ff.; P. Collinet, La Procedure par Libelle (Etudes Historiques 
sur Ie Droit de Iustinien) (Paris), 1932, vol. 4, p. 365; J. Gaudemet, "L'Empereur, Interprete du 
Droit" Fest. Rabel, 1954, vol. 2, p. 169 ff.; U. Zilletti, Studi sui Proeesso Civile Giustinianeo 
(Milano), 1965; M. Kaser, Das Romisehe Zivilprozessreeht op. cit. at p. 501; and also G. Bassanelli, 
"La Legislazione Processuale", op.cit. at 119 ff. 
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In the Codex Theodosianus (XI, 29) and in the Codex Iustinianus (VIT, 
61), an entire title is reserved to the matter de relationibus. The first 
constitution of the Codex Theodosianus, attributed to Emperor 
Constantine and addressed to the corrector Lucaniae et Brittiorum,78 
reads: " .. .In view of the fact that there remains to litigants the legitimate 
choice of an appeal from decisions, you must consult Our Majesty only 
concerning a few matters which cannot be decided by judicial sentence, 
in order that you may not interrupt Our imperial occupations."79 
Gaudemet offers an excellent justification of this practice: "All 
jurisdiction, whether by single judge or by jury, was therefore allowed to 
follow this procedure (per relationem). This was normal, since the 
Emperor is not conceived here as a hierarchically superior instance -
which might have served to justify an interdiction to inferior judges to try 
the case directly. The emperor intervenes in his capacity as sole course of 
law and justice. "80 This is not the place to examine in detail the norms 
determining the various steps of a per relationem procedure and the 
connected interventions of the Emperors.8l 
We would only remark that at first the Emperors, wishing to maintain 
direct contact with civil officials throughout the provinces and anxious to 
promote and expand the use of Roman law rather than of local customary 
norms, favored the procedure. 82 But quite soon, at the time of 
Constantine (God. Theod. 11.29.2), the Emperors came to recognize the 
need for restricting this procedure, in order to avoid overloading the 
imperial courts. 
The final link of this evolutionary chain is probably the promulgation by 
Justinianus of the Novella 125, De Iudicibus dated 543 AD, by which the 
Emperor endeavored to resist the impact of practice by prohibiting 
judges trying a case from asking the Emperor's advice on mere points of 
fact or on inferences to be drawn from them. The Emperor order the 
78. On the corrector Lucaniae et Brittiorum see A.M. Rabello, "I Privilegi dei Chierici sotto 
Costantino", 1970, 16 Labeo 391 n. 13, with bibliography. 
79. Super paucis, quae iuridica sententia decidi non possunt, nostram debes consulere 
maiestatem, ne occupationes nostras interrompas, cum litigatoribus legitimum rernaneat artibrium a 
sententia provocandi. 
80. From "L 'Empereur, Interprete du Droit" op.cit. 
81. For such an examination, see the essay by G. Bassanelli: "La Legislazione Processuale", 
op. cit. with rich bibliography. 
82. "If any judge should suppose that a case ought to be referred to Us, he must pronounce no 
decision, but rather he shall consult Our Wisdom on the point on which he supposes that there is 
some doubt; but if he should render a decision, he must not thereafter deter litigants from appealing 
therefrom by promising to refer the matter to US. Given on the fourth day before the ides of 
February at Sirmium in the year of the fifth consulship of Constantine Augustus and the consulship 
of Licinius Casear. February 10, 319; February 7, 318." 
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judge to "perfecte examinare causam et quod sibi iustum atque 
legitimum visum sit iudicare,"83 remarking that should one of the parties 
feel injured by the decision, he still has the right to appeal. 84 A certain 
assumption may thus be made that the Novella 125 of Justinian actually 
lays down the same rule as later adopted by modern legal systems, by 
imposing upon the judges the duty to pronounce judgment in all cases.85 
V. THE PROBLEM IN JEWISH AND MOSLEM LAW: SOME 
REMARKS, WITH SUGGESTIONS DE LEGE CONDENDA 
It may be interesting to note that both the Jewish and the Islamic legal 
systems allow the judge to abstain from pronouncing sentence in certain 
cases. In Jewish law, it may be said that the judge must as a rule take 
care to reach the proper decision, in accordance with his responsibility 
towards God but without undue fear as to the consequences of his 
decision. Some rules deal with possible doubts and how to dispose of 
them. The solutions vary according to the subject matter, a distinction 
being made between mere proprietary rights (dinei mammonoth) and 
cases involving problems of "sanctity", such as marriage.86 
83. " ... to examine the case with the utmost care and to pronounce in accordance with what 
appears to them fair and legitimate". It will be recalled that around that time a theory of evidence 
was being formulated, providing the judge with additional criteria of judgment. On this point see 
G.G. Archi, "La Prova nel Diritto del Basso Impero," 1961, 12 lura 1 et seq.; Idem. "Les Preuves 
dans Ie Droit du Bas Empire" Rec. Bodin op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 389 ff.; U. Zilletti, "Studi sulle Prove nel 
Drinio Giustinianeo", 1964,68 BIDR 167 ff.; also M. Kaser, "Rom Zivilprozesrecht" op. cit. at p. 
485 ff.; and now D. Simon, Untersuchungen zum Justinianischen Zivilprozess (Munchen), 1969, 135 
ff. and G. Provera's review in, 1970, 21 lura 211 ff. 
84. On Novella 125 and on the former Novella 113, see especially: N. van der Wal, Manuale 
Novel/arum lustiniani (Amsterdam), 1964,48 and n. 4 and 147 no.2: ("henceforth the judges are 
forbidden to consult with the emperor" (in French); U. Zilleni, Studi sui Processo - op. cit., at p. 46 
and n. 103, p. 261, et seq.; G. Bassanelli, "La Legislazione Processuale" op. cit. at p. 162 ff. and 214: 
" ... But the codification of Justinian had even deeper repercussions in the history of trial, for it 
brought about radical changes in the relationship between the judge and the law to be administered 
by him. This is especially evident in the history of trial per relationem: regulated by Justinian in 529 
(Cod. I, 14, 12), it was entirely abolished after the codification by Novella 25". 
85. In the present article we have discussed the question mainly as it arises in civil law. For a 
study of its aspect in criminal law, see TH. Mommsen, Romische Strafrecht, 1899, 4233 ff.; 
Hartmann, "Ampliatio" W, RE, 1894, vol. I, col. 1979 ff.; F. Lanfranchi, II Diritto nei Retori 
Romani (Milano), 1938,553 ff.; U. Brassiello, "Processo Penale Romano", 1966, 13 NND/1159: 
("At the completion of the evidence, the jury has the right to abstain from judgment, declaring sibi 
non liquere and ordering additional research. This leads to the ampliatio"). Ampliatio was in 
"Roman criminal procedure the reiteration of all the evidence when the jury declared that the case 
has not been sufficiently elucidated and required further (amplius) investigation", A. Berger 
Encyclopedic Dictionary op.cit. at p. 361. On Lex Acilila see S. Riccobono, FIRA voU, p. 84 et seq. 
and p. 94. 
86. For a thorough analysis on this point see P. Shifman, "On the Concept of Doubt ('Safek') in 
Halacha and Law" I, 1974, Shena ton Ha-Mishpat Haivri 328. In addition, see H. Ben-Menahem, "Is 
There Always One Uniquely Correct Answer to a Legal Question in the Talmud", 1987, 6 The 
Jewish Law Annual 164. For further background, the historical aspect is dealt with in Lamm & 
Kirschenbaum, "Freedom and Constraint in the Jewish Judicial Process", 1979, I Cardozo Law 
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Nevertheless, the Misha recognizes the judge's right to remain in doubt 
and to declare explicitly "I do not know" (Sanhedrin, 3, 6): " .. .if two 
(judges) find him innocent, two deem him guilty and the fifth says "I do 
not know" - additional judges must be appointed to the case. "87 
This rule is based upon the great respect due to the judge's conscience 
and the responsibility of his function. It is interesting to note that when a 
judge is suspicious of the plaintiff s intentions he should refrain from 
judgment, regardless of any evidence presented by the plaintiff himself; 
but this will not prevent another judge from hearing the case de novo. 88 
As for Moslem law, "in cases where the qadi feels unable to come to a 
correct decision on the basis of the evidence offered, he is allowed to 
abstain from judgment... Equally, where the relevant rule of law is itself 
a matter of doubt the qadi is not forced to give judgment...if no positive 
indication appears to him, (he must) abandon the case and refrain from 
judgment, there being doubt in his heart."89 
This brief historical and comparative survey shows that in modern legal 
systems the judge may not refrain from giving judgment, either in favor 
or against the plaintiffs claim.90 By delivering his decision the judge 
Review 99. Dissertation by P. Shifman, Uncertainty in the Validity of Marriage in Israeli Law 
(thesis, Jerusalem, 1972, in Hebrew, not yet published). 
87. See also the Mishna Sanhedrin, 5, 5. 
88. On this point see P. Shifman, op. cit., p. 14 et seq.; where the author remarks that in the 
Middle Ages, due primarily to the influence of Rabbenu Asher (Rosh), there was a change in 
directives. If the judge has good reason to suspect fraud on the part of the plaintiff, he has to decide 
the case in favor of the defendant; and conversely, if his suspicions fall upon the defendant, he must 
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discharges his obligations as they stem from the law and from the 
judicial process. He is functus officio. 
By consenting to act as judge, he has in effect waived the right to remain 
in doubt, whatever the nature of the case. He cannot claim not to know 
how to behave in the context of the controversy with which he is 
confronted in his court of justice, either under judge-made law or within 
the scope of legislative enactments. 
Generally speaking the function of the judge is highly respected, but we 
should make some allowance for the fact that he is only a human being 
judging his fellow man; and proportio hominis ad hominem should be 
preserved. The possibility of appeal does not remove, or does not entirely 
remove, the doubts of adjudication, all the more since every judgment 
raises a certain presumption of truth, which may form the basis for the 
full-fledged doctrine of res iudicata. Therefore a simple revival of non 
liquet, however desirable it might appear in theory, would hardly be 
practicable. A proper mitigation might perhaps be found in the attitude 
adopted by some legal systems, which, without relaxing the judge's duty 
to adjudicate, withhold the full effects of res iudicata whenever the 
decision has been reached only through lack of proof and not upon facts 
clearly found by the judge. This concession may usefully serve to 
reconcile the conflicting requirements of truth and justice, on the one 
hand, and certainty, on the other. 
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